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Does Eurodollar Borrowing Improve the
Dollar’s Exehange Value?
DAVID H. RESLEB
“In a further move to improve the international position of the dollar, the
Board of Governors on August 28, 1978, announced a change in reserve require.
ments to make it more attractive for member banks to borrow funds in the
Eurodollar market, .. The new action involves a reduction from 4 percent to
zero in the reserve requirement on foreign borrowings of member banks, pri-
marily Eurodollars, from their foreign branches and other foreign banks.”
Federal Reserve BULLETIN, September 1978.
- ABLY in 1978 the dollar began to decline sharply
in value in the foreign exchange markets. This dra-
matic decline, shown in Chart 1, precipitated several
Federal Reserve policy actions, culminating in last
November’s comprehensive dollar rescue effort under-
taken in cooperation with the Treasumy. This action
consisted of a combination of dollar-supporting efforts
including an expansion of both direct foreign exchange
intervention and swap arrangements, and an an-
nounced increase in the discount rate. While these ac-
tions seem to have successfully abated the dollar’s
decline, the desired improvement in the dollar’s inter-
national position has been modest.
The action taken last November was the most
dramatic of several actions taken to support the
dollar.2 The quotation above identifies another such
dollar-supporting move. By removing the reserve re-
quirements against Eurodollar borrowing, the Fed in-
tended to encourage the use of this source of funds
in order to generate a net increase in the demand for
mFederal Reserve Bulletin (September 1978), p. 777. The reg-
ulations affected by this policy action are Regulations I) and
M. Regulation I) specifies the reserve requirements member
banks must meet for various liability classificatiomms. Regsmlation
Ni governs the Federal Reserve’s treatmemst of foreign branch
banks. It is important to note that the computation of the
reserve requirement against “Eurodollar borrowimugs” was ac-
tually on net ba/ances due to foreign branches.
tm
Imm addition to the action indicated fax the quotation, the Fed-
eral Reserve has increased the discount rate several times
during the past )eam. For an assessmeiut of the effect of these
discount rate changes em! tIme exchange rate, see Douglas R.
Mudd, “Did Discount Rate Changes Affect the Foreign Ex-
charuge Value of the Dollar During 1978?” this Review (April
1979), pp. 20-26.
the dollar and thereby increase its foreign exchange
vaisse. This paper examines analytically the conditions
under which removal of these reserve requirements
would improve the dollar’s foreign exchange value.
Available data relating to Eurodollar borrowing offer
little evidence that this policy initiative has fulfilled its
intentions.
Eurodollars are simply dollar-denominated deposits
placed in a bank outside the United States. Anyone
may own Eurodollars and these owners may reside in
a foreign couutrv or in the United States. They may
As this article was published, the Federal Re-
serve announced a comprehensive change in pol-
icy that includes Eurodollar borrowing. Eurodol-
lar borrowing will be included in the calculation
of “managed liabilities,” Increases in the total of
these managed liabilities above a base level will
be subject to an 8 percent marginal reserve re-
quirement. This action, however, does not re-
move the differential reserve requirement be-
tween large CDs and Eurodollar borrowing. In
fact, the new policy action may further stimulate
the substitution of Eurodollars for large CDs that
this paper examines.
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Source, Federal Reserve Bulletin
The countries ,ncluded in the weighted.overoge foreign interest rate and exchange rate series are Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. rhe
we,ghts and tormula used in constructing these series are from ‘‘Index of the Weigiled-Averoge Exchange
Value of the U.S. Dollar, Revision,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin August l978}
he private citizens, nonfinancial corporations, other
banks or flnarmcial intermedianes, or official instittmtions
of forei gum governments.
IViotives for holding Eurodollars are equally diverse.
The prin’marv motive, however, is that Eurodollars are
short—term dollar-denominated assets \vhich pay an at-
tractive vmelcl. Those extensively engaged in interna-
tional trade view the market as especialir’ convenient.
\Vith a largc’ vOlmune of trade ultimately’ conducted in
dollars, the Eurodollar market provides a relatively
high ~‘ielding outlet for dollar balances that obviates
munch of the risk-and transactions costs associated
with converting them into a foreign asset or with in-
vesting then, directly in U.S. capital markets.
Despite the “Eurodollar” designation, time market is
not exclusivel located in Europe. Though the largest
part of the market’s activity takes place in London,
the rest of Europe and such diverse locations as Sing-
apore, the Bahamas, and the Cay-man Islands account
for a substantial volume of
Eurodollar activity.




lar to that of other banks.
They issue liabilities (that
is, they accept deposits)
which they use to acquire
earniug assets, primarily
loans to customers and fi-
nancial investments such as
bonds, commercial paper,
and so on. As with other
intermediaries, Eurobanks’
profits are the differential
between earnings received
on their assets and the
costs of their liabilities.
Eurodollar deposits dif-
fer from domestic U.S. bank
deposits in one often over-
looked but very important
respect: Generally, liabili-
ties of Eurobanks are not
uucheckable deposits.” Euro-
dollar depositors cannot
write drafts on their depos-
its. In other words, Euro-
dollars are not “money” in
the same sense that demand
deposits and U.S. currency
are money. Eurodollars are, instead, most comparable
to various “near-monies” like large denomination cer-
tificates of deposit (CDs)
Thes-e are two important links between the Eurodol-
lar maiket and the U.S. banking system. First, and
most important to this discussion, mans’ Eurodollar
banks aie branches or subsidiaries of U.S. commercial
banks. This means that U.S. parent banks have an aux-
I imt dc gt cc of Iuqtumdttm of I us odoll Sn sanes auth the tet us
o sitat” nt>’ of time deps,sit. The usmaturity of Eutodollar de—
psmsits ranges frssns overnigist to, more typically, 30 days or
nsssre. ‘list- exteuut to which Eurodollars add to the worlds
liquid balances aimd thereby represent a source of wcsricl immlla—
tion is perhaps the smmtsst controvet-sial aspect of the market.
Fssr a s’cc-esmt chscsussion cmf this problem. see Adrian W.
Throop, ‘‘Eurobam skis mg anci World luffati(sit, Voice of tim c’
Federal Reserce Bank of Do//u.s ( Angnust 1979), pp. 8—23.
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TabI 1
Effective Cost of Bank Liabilities
(1) (2)
Eurodollar Certificates (3)
Borrowing of Deposit Difference
1977 August 656% 6.29% 27%
Septeenbe 683 657 26
October 7 44 6.64 80
November 739 711 28
December 7 42 7 15 27
1978 Januoy 763 7.37 26
February 7.58 7 33 25
March 7 57 7.29 28
April 769 7,48 .21
May 815 789 26
June 8 68 8.32 .36
July 8 88 8.63 .25
August 8.83 8 56 27
S ptember 9.12 916 04
October 10.12 10.02 .10
Novemb r 11.51 11.65 14
December 1162 11.63 Cl
1979 January it 16 11.41 .25
February 10.79 11 07 28
Mach 10.64 11.01 37
Apri 1060 10,92 32
May 1075 11.03 —.28
June 1052 1082 30
July 10.87 1099 12
Augutt 1153 1162 09
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median’, a Eurohank maintains a stock of readily
accessible funds (reserves) to meet day-to-day trans-
actions and clearing requirements. One of the most
striking and controversial features of the Eurodollar
system is that, unlike domestic banks, the level of re-
serves held by Eurobanks is not regulated. This does
not mean, however, that Eurobanks hold no reserves.
Profit-maximizing considerations determine the opti-
mal level of precautionary reserves for Eurobanks,
The special characteristics of this market result in very
low levels of reserves relative to total deposit volume.4
Generally, Eurobanks’ deposits with U.S. banks serve
as precautionary reserves for the Eurodollar market.
As previously noted, U.S. banks often obtain liabil-
ities from the Eurodollar market by borrowing from
their own branches or from other Eurobanks. Like
other forms of foreign borrowing, this practice in-
creases U.S. liabilities to foreigners and lowers
(raises) the short-term international capital account
deficit (surplus).
Falling deficits or rising surpluses generally indicate
an increasing demand for dollars which in turn implies
a rising value of the dollar in foreign exchange mar-
kets.5 This is the connection between Eurodollar bor-
rowing and the foreign exchange rate that the August
28, 1978 policy action attempted to exploit.
The connection between the net liquidity deficit and
the foreign exchange rate, however, is more compli-
cated when Eurodollars are borrowed because such
borrowing need not result in a currency conversion.
To see this point more clearly, consider the following
example: When a U.S. resident borrows from a for-
eigner, he usually issues a dollar-denominated IOU.
‘
t
Fcsr botls a theoretical ansd empirical discnsssion of optimal
Eut-odoilar reserves, see Jolsn 11. Makin, ‘‘Identifyissg a Reserve
Base for the Euro-Dollar System,” Journal of Finance (June
1973), pp. 609-17 and David 11. Resler, A Study of the
1-:,:ro—Dol/ar Market: U.s Origin atmrl Interaction with U.S.
Monetary Policy, usnpublished Ph.D. dissertation (The Ohio
State University. 1977).
5
1t is iasportant to nsote that increased borrowing by U.S. banks
tends to iosprcsve (lower) the U.S. halance-of-paynnents defi-
cit as nseasurecl on a sset liqssidity basis. It need not and
probably does not, howevet-. exert any impact on the “official
settlessments” balance. This balance is based only on official
governmental settlements. In the ease above, no intergovem-
mental traussaetiosss are involved. F’or a detailerl discnssion
of this di,stinsction. see Donald S. Kemp. “Balance of Pay-
osessts Concepts — Wlsat Do Tlsey’ Really Means?” this Review
(July 1975), pp. 14-23.
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To purchase this debt instrument, the foreigner first
acquires dollars through the foreign exchange market,
thereby increasing the demand for dollars. If, how-
ever, the foreigner already possesses dollar-denomi-
nated assets such as Eurodollars, the transaction does
not involve the foreign exchange market even though
the U.S. net liquidity deficit falls. Thus, Eurodollar
borrowing need not increase the demand for dollars in
the foreign exchange markets.
But, can Eurodollar borrowing produce a net in-
crease in the demand for dollars? The answer is a
qualified yes. Elimination of the reserve requirements
against Eurodollar borrowing effectively reduces the
cost of this source of funds. This tends to increase the
total demand for Eurodollar borrowings, thereby bid-
ding up the Eurodollar loan (and deposit) rate. If
the higher relative yield on Eurodollars produces an
increase in the general level of U.S. interest rates, it
may induce a substitution of dollars for other curren-
cies. When this occurs, the demand for dollars and
the dollar exchange rate will increase. On the other
hand, the higher yield on Eurodollars may induce
only a snbstitution among dollar assets, Owners of
domestic dollar CDs or U.S. Treasury bills, for in-
stance, may switch to Eurodollars. The extent to
which Eurodollars are substituted for other dollar-
denominated assets, then, is the key factor in evalu-
ating the effect this policy action has on the foreign
exchange value of the dollar.
:.LsT c..~
py14.;.yrrL:~Jc: c:5y2( J~~%~’
When a bank meets a reserve requirement, the cost
of its funds includes both the interest expense and
the earnings foregone on the idle balances (reserves)
it must hold. The elimination of reserve requirements
against Eurodollar borrowing lowers the effective cost
of these funds to U.S. banks.°When making portfolio
decisions about their liability structure, banks com-
pare the effective cost of funds for alternative liabil-
ities. Thus, in assessing the relative attractiveness of
Eurodollar borrowings, the effective cost of these
funds must be compared with alternative liabilities.
Eurodollar horrorvings can be considered a substi-
tute for large denomination ($100,000 or more) CDs
issued by U.S. banks. The effective cost of funds for
~Specifieally, the effective cost (C
5







where ij and r are the interest rate and required reserve ratio
for the liability.
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these two liabilities and the differences between them
over the last two years are reported in Table 1.~ While
a modest cost advantage in favor of Eurodollar bor-
rowing emerged temporarily in September 1978, a per-
sistent cost advantage in favor of Eurodollar borrow-
ing has prevailed only since November 1978 when
the Federal Reserve increased the reserve require-
ment against large CDs from 6 percent to 8 percent.
The cost differential fell dramatically following this
action.tm
Data presented in Table 1 show that the elimination
of reserve requirements against Eurodollar borrowing
did little by itself to encourage a preferential shift by
U.S. banks toward borrowing Eurodollars. The Fed’s
action of November 1, raising reserve requirements
on CDs, however, appears to have eventually encour-
aged Eurodollar borrowing.
A persistent effective cost differential in favor of
Eurodollar borrowing began to emerge in November
1978. Since U.S. banks’ cost of funds had become
higher in the domestic CD market than in the Euro-
dollar market, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. banks
would have attempted to reduce their CD holdings
relative to borrowing in the Eurodollar market.
One way for banks to replace CDs with Eurodollars
without endangering well-established customer rela-
tionships is to encourage their depositors to place CDs
directly with the banks’ foreign branches. U.S. banks
could then borrow from these branches at a lower ef-
fective cost. This transaction produces offsetting short-
term dollar flows with no net change in the demand
for dollars. The Federal Reserve recognized this po-
tential in its August 28 announcement when it
reemphasized the importance of compliance by U.S.
banks with its previous requests not to solicit or to
T
Data in column I of Table I tend to overstate the effective
cost of Eurodollar bcsrrowings. The reason is that, as noted us
footnote 1, the relevant reserve requirement applies to net
balances due to foreign branches. Since the aggregate net
position of the banking system was negative preceding the
policy revision, only a snsall number of banks could have been
net borrowers from the market. It is only for these banks that
the calculated effective cost of Eurodollar funds is appropriate.
5
A brief digression on the characteristics of this cost differen-
tial should prove illnuninatissg. In constructing Table I, the
Essrodollar borrowing rate is the three—month interbassk bass
rate as published by the Federal Reserve. This reported rate
represents the Eurobank’s opportunity cost of leading to a
U.S. (i.e., its parent) bank. A U.S. bank may be willing to
borrow from its Eurobank branch even when the cost differ-
ential favors the CD nsarket. This osay occur if earnings and
costs of the parent and branch are differentially treated under
the relevant tax latvs for the two banks. Thus, even a small
positive cost differential may be consistent with a donsestie
bank’s preference for Eurodollar borrowing.
Page 13encourage deposits by U.S. residents at their foreign
branches
Data suggest that vers little of this direct transfer
has occurred (Table 2. column 2). Eurodollar deposits
of U.S. noubank residents have increased steadily since
May 1978 but have shown no dramatically sharper rise
when large CDs have fallen, These data, however,
probably understate the value of CDs that U.S. resi-
dents have replaced rvith Eurodollar deposits. Instead
of transferring deposits to branches of U.S. banks,
U.S. residents may have established Eurodollar ac-
counts with foreign banks. These banks could then sell
Eurodollar CDs in a secondary nsarket to U.S. foreign
branches. The net effect of these transactions is the
same as when U.S. residents deposit funds directly
with the branches. The innportant difference, however,
is that the transactions outlined here would not pro-
tlFederal Reserve Bulletin (September 1978), p. 778.
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duce any changes in the foreign branches’ liabilities
to U.S. nonbanks.
Any empirical assessment of Eurodollar borrowing
by U.S. banks must begin with a word of caution:
Since Eurodollar borrowings are not directly reported
br’ U.S. banks, available data provide only approxima-
tions of the actual borrowing volume.
In October of this ~‘ear, the Federal Reserve Board
initiated reporting of new data that provide useful
approdmations for Eurodollar borrowing.10 These
data record net balances due to directly related for-
eign institutions. The data measure the net direction
of the flow of funds between the U.S. banking system
and the Eurodollar market. Eurodollar borrowing by
U.S. banks represents only part of the net flow of
funds and may be offset by loans from U.S. banks to
Eurobanks. Nevertheless, changes in net balances due
to directly related foreign institutions represent a rea-
sonable proxy for changes in Eurodollar borrowing.
For instance, an increase of 81 billion in the “net
balances” is interpreted as an increase in Eurodollar
borrowing of $1 billion. Data for this measure of Euro-
dollar borrowing are given in Table 3.
Data reported in Table 3 reveal that Eurodollar bor-
rowing by U.S. banks changed very little in the four
months immediately following the change in reserve
requirements. At the same time, the data indicate that
Eurodollar borrowing has increased sharply since Jan-
uarv 1979. Column 1 shows that, in January 1979, the
net flow of dollars from U.S. banks to their own
branches began to reverse itself. The net outflo-cv fell
substantially each month and finally became a net in-
flow from Eurobanks in May 1979, This flow reversal
is attributable to the extensive Eurodollar borrowing
by U.S. banks. The data reveal that U.S. banks have
increased their Eurodollar horrorving from their own
branches by $19 billion since the beginning of the
year. Over the same period, total net balances due to
related foreign institutions increased b~- more than $26
billion. Both data are essentially consistent with the
incentive pattern reported in Table 1. The data sug-
gest that the increase in Eurodollar borrorving this
year can be attributed less to the Fed’s elimination of
reserve requirements against Eurodollar borrowing
than to the Fed’s increase in reserve requirements
against large CDs.
nob0 the past. nsost researchers measured borro’ving with gross
claims (in dollars) of foreigts branch banks on their parent
U.S. bank. This measured only Eurodollar borrowings from
their own branches but did not record borrowing from other
Eurobauks nor did it account for borrowing by nonmember
I. .5. bansks. Nevertheless, these data were the only useful
proxies for Eurodollar borrowing.
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Table 2
Large CD5 and Eurodollar Deposits
of U.S Reskients
(Billions of Dollars, Nat Seasonally Adjusted)
U.S Nonbanks
Large Eurodollar 0 poshs
Denomination at Foreign Branches
COs of US Banks







August 88 0 24 3
September 903 21.8
October 90 8 24 7
November 96 4 25 9
De ember 99 5 25 0
1979 January 101.1 305
Fbuary 996 315
March 975 33 0
April 92 6 33.5
May 889 348
June 84.4 35 3
July 840 NA
August 86 4N A.
S psember 89 8N A
OLR redertfteen-velill - d13° do Goernor oftise
a tire V ~tessnTable 3







Chartered Related (3) Borrow
Banks lnstitul,ons Total ing
1978 January $136 $115 $21
February 132 110 22 $01
March 147 112 35 1.3
Apr’l 111 108 03 3.2
May 117 120 0.3 06
June 118 13.3 1.5 12
July 95 126 31 1.6
August 105 129 24 07
September 10.3 148 45 2.1
October 99 170 7.1 26
Navember 98 18,0 82 11
December 107 170 63 —19
1979 January 101 164 63 0.0
February 63 183 120 57
Mar h 4.5 20.8 16 43
April 1.9 20.8 189 2.6
May 25 206 232 43
June 58 217 275 43
July 63 22.8 291 16
Augut 89 238 327 36
Eq ale Chant in Column
SOURCE- Fed lire erve HI tna nd tIn Boat ‘I’ os no on
lilt F e at Re e e 5. em
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The overall success of the August policy action in
terms of its effect on the dollar’s exchange value de-
pends on whether this Eurodollar borrowing is substi-
tuted for more conventional liabilities, such as large
denomination CDs. If this has occurred, there is little
reason to believethat the increased borrowing by U.S.
banks has produced a net increase in the demand for
dollars in foreign exchange markets. To evaluate the
extent of this liability substitution (“round-tripping”),
the behavior of large CDs over this period must be
examined. Data on this liability (Table 2) reveal a
substantial reduction in the total amount of CDs out-
standing since the beginning of the year. From the
January peak of $101.1 billion, CDs fell to $84.0 bil-
lion in July, a drop which accompanies the emergence
of a relative cost disadvantage for CDs (reported in
Table 1). It is interesting to note that, as CDs fell by
about $17 billion from January to July, liabilities of
U.S. banks to their foreign branches rose by $17.4 bil-
lion. The general pattern in this data suggests an ap-
parent switching of Eurodollars and large CDs.11
In Augnst and September, data on the volume of
CDs and preliminary data on Eurodollar borrowing
both show an increase in response to strong U.S. credit
demands. This suggests that, since the cost advantage
in favor of Eurodollar borrowing has now virtually
disappeared, both liabilities will grow in response to
overall credit demand.
So far, the discussion has ignored any effect this
substitution of Eurodollar borrowiug for domestic
CDs may have on the U.S. money supply. Since the
primary advantage to U.S. banks from borrowing
Eurodollars is that these liabilities are not subject to
reserve requirements, the substitution of Eurodollar
borrowing for CDs “liberates” reserves. For example,
suppose a U.S. bank allows its CDs to decline by $1
million and offsets this outflow by borrowing $1 nnil-
lion from its foreign branch. The bank’s total liability
position is unchanged by the transaction. The bank’s
asset side, however, shows that the transaction has
tm1The data on Eurodollar borrowing is not sufficiently accurate
to warrant the eonelstsion that this switehover has been
complete, since it seetns inappropriate to argue that only
Eurodollars have replaced CDs. More extensive use by do-
mestic money managers of other short-tesm financial instru-
ments including repurchase agreements and eonsmereial paper
has probably also diminished their use of CDs.
generated an additional $.08 million in excess reserves
which it can then lend. Lending these newly gener-
ated excess reserves increases the U.S. money supply
unless the increase in excess reserves is offset by Fed-
eral Reserve open market operations.
Of course, such an increase in the tnoney supply
could prove counterproductive to the Fed’s ob-
jective of improving the dollar’s foreign exchange
value. If the faster growth of money leads to a higher
expected rate of inflation in the United States and,
hence, lowers the value of the dollar in the future,
the dollar’s current foreign exchange value will also
fall as speculators attempt to minimize the anticipated
exchange rate loss.
Unless Federal Reserve open market operations off-
set this increase in reserves, there will be a multiple
expansion of the money supply equal to the money
multiplier times the newly liberated reserves. Under
this assumption, the reduction in CDs of $17 billion
Page 15from January to July (if offset by an equal increase in
Eurodollar borrowing) would have resulted in about
a $3.4 billion increase in Mi.12 This announts to roughly
40 percent of the increase in Ml (not seasonally ad-
justed) that occurred from Jamiary to July 1979, and
suggests that increases in Eurodollar borrowing have
contributed to a more rapid expansion of the money
supply. Since foreign exchange rates are sensitive to
differential rates of anticipated inflation (and, hence,
money growth), Eurodollar borrowing of this magni-
tude would indeed have affected the dollar’s exchange
value, hut in a direction opposite to that intended by
the Federal Reserve Board.
By raising the reserve requirement on large CDs
after eliminating the reserve requirement for Eurodol-
lar borrowings, the Federal Reserve induced U.S.
banks to borrow from their foreign branches. The
combination of these two policy changes contributed
to a rapid expansion in Eurodollar borrowing. These
policies would have to be judged a success were their
~2Thiscalculation assumes a constant money multiplier of 2.5.
sole intent to increase Eurodollar borrowing. While
the elimination of reserve requirements against Euro-
dollars should increase demand for Eurodollars, it
need not increase the demand for dollars in the for-
eign exchange market. However, the stated objective
was to encourage Eurodollar borrowing which, in
turn, would increase the foreign exchange value of the
dollar. The link between Eurodollar borrowing and
the foreign exchange value of the dollar, however, is
more tenuous than that implicit in the Fed’s actions.
Though the data do not permit a definitive analysis,
available evidence suggests that a by-product of these
policy actions has been the substitution of Eurodollar
borrowing for CDs. This kind of substitution does not
involve foreign exchange transactions and therefore
has little direct effect on the dollar’s exchange value.
There may, however, he an indirect effect on the
foreign exchange value of the dollar. Substitution of
reserve-free Eurodollar borrowing for reservable CDs
has the potential to increase the U.S. money supply.
Unless Federal Reserve open-market operations offset
the increase in reserves that this substitution produces,
the more rapid growth of money that results may ac-
tually depress the dollar’s foreign exchange value.